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DAY OF RECKONING: TRUMP, THE EMOLUMENTS 
CLAUSES, AND PREVENTING CORRUPTION OF THE 
PRESIDENCY 
Bridget K. M. Brodie* 
I. INTRODUCTION1
Since President Donald Trump’s2 election,3 there has been
increased scrutiny of his alleged violation of the Foreign and 
Domestic Emoluments Clauses (the Clauses).4  In District of 
* J.D. Candidate, May 2020, University of Baltimore School of Law; Certificate in
Paralegal Studies, August 2015, Georgetown University; B.A., Philosophy and
Political Science, May 2015, University of Mary Washington.  To my husband,
Jake—my rock, for his devotion; to my parents, whose passion for education and
persistence in helping me succeed provided me the tools to get where I am today; to
Professor F. Michael Higginbotham, for providing invaluable guidance and support
throughout the writing process; and to the editors and staff of the University of
Baltimore Law Review, for their commitment to the editing process: thank you.
1. While this Comment proceeded through the University of Baltimore Law Review’s
editing process, District of Columbia v. Trump was reversed by the Fourth Circuit in
In re Trump for lack of standing; the Fourth Circuit did not discuss the District
Court’s definition of “emolument.”  In re Trump, 928 F.3d 360, 374–80 (4th Cir.
2019) (finding that “the link between government officials’ patronage of the Hotel
and the Hotel’s payment of profits or dividends to the President himself is simply too
attenuated”), reh’g en banc granted, No.18-2486, 2019 WL 5212216 (4th Cir. Oct.
15, 2019).  The content and argument of this Comment, however, remain relevant as it
considers the novel and timely issue of the Emoluments Clauses’ application to future
presidents, who are likely to have significant business interests and thus, greater risk
of conflicts of interests and undue influence.  See infra Section III.B.  See generally
Manuel Castells, The New Public Sphere: Global Civil Society, Communication
Networks, and Global Governance, in INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION 36, 38 (Daya
Kishan Thussu ed., 2010) (discussing the growth of globalization, including “global
domestic politics,” which allows anyone to connect and network virtually anywhere).
2. Donald Trump is the forty-fifth and current President of the United States.  Donald
Trump Biography, BIOGRAPHY (Apr. 16, 2018), https://www.biography.com/people/
donald-trump-9511238 [https://perma.cc/FSL6-R7F6].  Prior to taking office he was a
real estate mogul and reality TV star.  Id.
3. The official Republican candidate, Trump was elected president after defeating
Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton.  Id.  President Trump’s win stunned many
because numerous polls and media projections favored a Clinton victory.  Id.  Despite
losing the popular vote to Clinton by nearly 2.9 million votes, Trump won the
majority of electoral college votes, clinching the presidency.  Id.
4. See Second Amended Complaint at 1–2, Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in
Wash. v. Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (No. 1:17-cv-00458-RA),
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Columbia v. Trump, the United States District Court for the District 
of Maryland clarified the parameters of the Clauses.5  In so 
clarifying, the court held that the Clauses apply to the Office of the 
President and defined “emolument” to mean “any profit, gain, or 
advantage.”6 
The court’s holding calls into question whether its interpretation of 
the Clauses is consistent with previous interpretations and 
enforcement, as well as the purpose of the Clauses.7  If the district 
court’s decision stands (as it should),8 there could be long-lasting 
repercussions for future presidential candidates who have extensive 
private interests.9  The court’s decision raises the concern of whether 
there is consistent guidance in regard to ethical conduct in the 
Executive Branch, specifically regarding what will pose a conflict of 
interest issue under the Clauses.10 
The purpose of the Clauses is to protect the presidency from any 
undue influence and to maintain the President’s independence.11  In 
this relatively recent decision, the district court determined the 
application and scope of the Clauses in relation to the presidency for 
the first time in the Clauses’ history.12  It is evident that the broad 
vacated as justiciable, 939 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 2019); see Andrew M. Harris & Daniel 
Flatley, Congressional Democrats Can Sue Trump over Emoluments, Judge Says, 
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-28/ 
congressional-democrats-can-sue-president-over-emoluments 
[https://perma.cc/5N5D-BSP5]; see Ana Radelat, Federal Court Considers 
Blumenthal v. Trump Case, CONST. ACCOUNTABILITY CTR. (June 7, 2018), 
https://www.theusconstitution.org/news/federal-court-considers-blumenthal-v-trump-
case/ [https://perma.cc/L2PD-LVBC].  
5. See District of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 875, 883–85, 887–98 (D. Md.
2018), rev’d and remanded sub nom. In re Trump, 928 F.3d 360.
6. Id. at 885–86, 904.
7. See discussion infra Sections II.A, II.C.
8. See discussion infra Section III.A.
9. See discussion infra Section III.B.
10. See discussion infra Section III.B.
11. See Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 897; see also Andrew M. Harris, What You Need to




12. See Ann E. Marimow, Jonathan O’Connell & David A. Fahrenthold, Federal Judge
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definition of emolument, as determined by the court, brings to light 
discrepancies in the application and enforcement of the Clauses in 
regard to past presidencies.13  What stands out from the Trump 
decision and arguments regarding the scope and meaning of the 
Clauses is that while we desire that the most capable and qualified 
individuals run for president, that desire must be balanced against the 
need to prevent conflicts.14  Generally, the most qualified and capable 
candidates reach their positions after achieving great personal 
success, including the accumulation of large private business 
interests.15 
This Comment argues that to strike the proper balance between 
promoting qualified presidential candidates and preventing conflicts 
of interest under the Clauses, the power to appoint the Director of the 
Office of Government Ethics (OGE Director)16 should be removed 
from the President and given to Congress to ensure the OGE Director 
is an objective and independent ethicist.17  Congressional 
appointment of the OGE Director is a way to effectively prevent the 
President from taking advantage of the appointment power by 
selecting an individual believed to be more inclined to treat the 
President favorably.18  Congressional appointment will also ensure 
that the Clauses’ institutional purpose is acknowledged and 
respected: to guarantee that the President remains an independent and 
fair representative of the American people.19 
This Comment proceeds in three parts following this introduction.  
Part II discusses the background and purpose of the Clauses, as well 
as their resurgence in District of Columbia v. Trump.20  Part III 
13. See discussion infra Section II.C.
14. M.C.E., Conflicts of Interest and the President: Reviewing the State of Law in the
Face of a Trump Presidency, 4 EMORY CORP. GOVERNANCE ACCOUNTABILITY REV.
47, 59 (2017).
15. See Grant Suneson, America’s 12 Wealthiest Presidents, 24/7 WALL ST. (Feb. 12,
2018, 6:57 PM), https://247wallst.com/special-report/2018/02/12/americas-12-
wealthiest-presidents/ [https://perma.cc/2AFX-W65H].
16. The OGE provides leadership and oversight of the executive ethics program and is
designed to prevent and resolve conflicts of interest.  About OGE, U.S. OFF. GOV’T 
ETHICS, https://www.oge.gov/web/oge.nsf/About+OGE/ [https://perma.cc/2LKT-
6CM5] (last visited Dec. 18, 2019).
17. See infra Part IV.
18. See Julia Horowitz & Cristina Alesci, Former White House Ethics Chief Balks at
Trump’s Pick for Acting Director, CNN (July 21, 2017, 2:30 PM),
https://money.cnn.com/2017/07/21/news/trump-taps-new-oge-director/index.html
[https://perma.cc/4MQL-CSAD].
19. See District of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 875, 896–97 (D. Md. 2018).
20. See infra Part II.
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discusses the court’s decision and interpretation of the Clauses in 
Trump.21  Part III also proposes a solution to provide future 
presidents with more consistent ethical guidance as to what poses a 
constitutionally problematic conflict of interest.22  Part IV analyzes 
the proffered solution of moving the power to appoint the OGE 
Director from the President to Congress, and why such a solution 
helps to guarantee a balance of promoting qualified presidential 
candidates while also preventing conflicts of interest and undue 
influence.23  Part IV concludes by explaining why congressional 
appointment does not present any separation of powers concerns.24 
Rather, congressional appointment of the OGE Director will further 
strengthen the integrity of the nation’s highest office by guaranteeing 
the President’s independence as the leader of the free world.25 
II. THE EMOLUMENTS CLAUSES AND THEIR
RESURGENCE
A. Purpose and Background
The Foreign Emoluments Clause states that “no person holding any
office of profit or trust under them, shall, without the consent of the 
Congress, accept of any present, emolument, office, or title, of any 
kind whatever, from any king, prince, or foreign state.”26  The 
Domestic Emoluments Clause states that “[t]he President shall . . . 
receive for his Services, a compensation . . . during the period for 
which he shall have been elected, and he shall not receive within that 
period any other emolument from the United States, or any of 
them.”27  The Founding Fathers instituted these Clauses as anti-
corruption measures, believing that the President should be 
independent and protected from undue influence.28  Although the 
Clauses are a hotly contested issue during the Trump presidency, 
21. See infra Part III.
22. See infra Part III.
23. See infra Part IV.
24. See infra Section IV.B.
25. See infra Part IV.
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
27. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7.
28. See Harris, supra note 11; see also District of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d
875, 897 (D. Md. 2018).  “[The President] can, of course, have no pecuniary
inducement to renounce, or desert, the independence intended for him by the
constitution.”  JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES 544 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co.; Cambridge, Brown, Shattuck & Co. 1833)
(ebook).
2020] The Emoluments Clauses 221 
there is a general lack of precedent interpreting them.29  In fact, the 
Clauses have remained largely untouched in their two hundred year 
history, and no federal cases have provided a robust discussion of the 
scope of the Foreign Emoluments Clause or its application to the 
President.30   
The Clauses have been generally overlooked because most 
presidents either liquidate their personal assets or place them in a 
blind trust prior to taking office.31  Additionally, possible emolument 
issues have been preempted by the Foreign Gifts and Decorations 
Act, which largely provides congressional acceptance of small gifts.32  
The Foreign Emoluments Clause prohibits receipt of emoluments 
from foreign governments unless approved by Congress.33  The 
Foreign Gifts and Decorations Act automatically provides 
congressional approval of the Foreign Emoluments Clause for gifts 
of $390 or less.34 
Generally, past presidents have been extremely careful to avoid 
even the mere appearance of violating the Clauses.35  Prior to his 
inauguration, President Trump seemed to act in accordance with past 
presidents when he announced that he would turn over management 
29. See Marimow et al., supra note 12.
30. Seth Barrett Tillman, The Foreign Emoluments Clause – Where the Bodies Are
Buried: “Idiosyncratic” Legal Positions, 59 S. TEX. L. REV. 237, 238–39 (2017)
[hereinafter Foreign Emoluments Clause].
31. See Harris, supra note 11. But see Jennifer Wang, Why Trump Won’t Use A Blind
Trust and What His Predecessors Did with Their Assets, FORBES (Nov. 15, 2016, 9:00
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jenniferwang/2016/11/15/why-trump-wont-use-a-
blind-trust-and-what-his-predecessors-did-with-their-assets/#3e150f8629c0
[https://perma.cc/6Q3W-CPVL] (discussing that placing Trump’s assets into a blind
trust is possible, yet there are difficulties presented by the nature of Trump’s assets).
32. 5 U.S.C. § 7342 (2012); see also Amandeep S. Grewal, The Foreign Emoluments
Clause and the Chief Executive, 102 MINN. L. REV. 639, 639 (2017).
33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
34. 5 U.S.C. § 7342 (a)(3), (a)(5), (b)(2), (c)(1)(A) (2012); see also Foreign Gifts, U.S.
GEN. SERVICES ADMIN., https://www.gsa.gov/policy-regulations/policy/personal-
property-management-policy/foreign-gifts [https://perma.cc/U9P9-DJZR] (last
reviewed Mar. 21, 2018).
35. Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Fact-Checking What Donald Trump’s Lawyer Said About the
President-Elect’s Finances, WASH. POST (Jan. 12, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2017/01/12/fact-checking-claims-by-donald-trumps-
lawyer/?utm_term=.86add6d191df [https://perma.cc/3PNL-P5GK] (quoting Randall
Eliason).  For example, President Theodore Roosevelt won the Nobel Peace Prize
while in office but waited to accept the medal as well as the money until he was no
longer president.  Ronald D. Rotunda, Everything, Anything, Is an Emolument, JUSTIA
(Jan. 30, 2017), https://verdict.justia.com/2017/01/30/everything-anything-emolument
[https://perma.cc/5689-HAK5].
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of the Trump Organization to his two eldest sons.36  However, many 
members of Congress and a large portion of the electorate contend 
that the President’s actions are not sufficient to protect the presidency 
from corruption and undue influence.37 
B. The Resurgence of the Emoluments Clauses
President Trump was first and foremost a businessman,38 and
several parties in lawsuits against Trump argue that he still has his 
fingers in the Trump Organization’s business exploits and is thus 
benefitting from those exploits both here in the U.S. and abroad in 
violation of the Clauses.39  In District of Columbia v. Trump, the 
Maryland Attorney General and D.C. Attorney General alleged that 
Trump, through his and the Trump Organization’s ownership of the 
Trump International Hotel (the Hotel) in Washington, D.C., violated 
the Clauses by either directly or indirectly accepting payments from 
foreign and domestic governments.40 
While President Trump does not actively manage the Hotel, he 
continues to own and control it, including its bar, restaurant, and 
event spaces.41  This means that the President, either actually or 
potentially, directly or indirectly, shares in the profits that the Hotel 
and its amenities acquire.42  President Trump tried to avoid the legal 
36. District of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 875, 878 (D. Md. 2018); see also
Sharon LaFraniere, In Ruling Against Trump, Judge Defines Anticorruption Clauses
in Constitution for First Time, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/25/us/politics/trump-emoluments-lawsuit.html
[https://perma.cc/A33F-PBVT].
37. See Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 878–80; see also Second Amended Complaint at 1, 4–
7, 59–60, 62, Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 276 F. Supp.
3d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (No. 1:17-cv-00458-RA) (providing information of plaintiffs
and alleging violations of Emoluments Clause); see also Andrew M. Harris & Daniel
Flatley, Congressional Democrats Can Sue Trump over Emoluments, Judge Says,
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 28, 2018, 4:57 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2018-09-28/congressional-democrats-can-sue-president-over-emoluments
[https://perma.cc/DBP6-JH7L].
38. See Donald J. Trump, WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/people/donald-j-
trump/ [https://perma.cc/AFN8-HFYR] (last visited Dec. 18, 2019).
39. See Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 878–80; see Harris & Flatley, supra note 37.  Two
other suits were filed in addition to District of Columbia v. Trump, claiming Trump
violated the Foreign Emoluments Clause: Blumenthal v. Trump,  335 F. Supp. 3d 45,
50–51 (D.D.C. 2018) and Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Washington, 276 F.
Supp. 3d at 181.
40. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 877, 906–07.
41. Id. at 878 (discussing undisputed facts).
42. Id.
2020] The Emoluments Clauses 223 
consequences of this conduct by turning over management of the 
Trump Organization to his two eldest sons and providing that all 
profits from foreign governments would be donated to the United 
States Treasury.43  However, by the end of 2017, the Trump 
Organization claimed to have donated only $151,470 in February of 
the same year without providing further details.44  Additionally, 
President Trump created a trust to hold his business assets,45 but he 
seems to be able to obtain distributions from that trust at any time.46   
In Trump, the District Court for the District of Maryland 
determined that: (1) the textual interpretation, (2) the original public 
meaning and purpose of the Clauses, and (3) the practice and 
precedent of the Executive Branch supported the finding that the 
presidency is subject to the Clauses’ restrictions.47  The court also 
held that emolument is to be defined broadly, including “any profit, 
gain, or advantage, of more than de minimis value, received by him, 
directly or indirectly, from foreign, the federal, or domestic 
governments.”48  With these determinations, the court held that the 
President’s continued entanglement and access to profits from the 
Hotel, where domestic, federal, and foreign leaders have visited and 
spent large sums of money, constituted a violation of both Clauses.49  
One contention with the district court’s determination of what 
constitutes an emolument is that it raises questions as to the 
consistency in the application and enforcement of the Clauses to prior 
presidents.50   
43. Id.; see also Rotunda, supra note 35.
44. Marimow et al., supra note 12.
45. A document filed with an alcohol board in Washington, D.C. revealed that Trump’s
interest in the historic post office building, which was rebuilt by Trump into one of his
luxury hotels, has been transferred into a revocable trust.  Jill Disis, What We Know,
and Don’t, About Trump’s Trust, CNN (Feb. 8, 2017, 8:13 AM), https://money.cnn.co
m/2017/02/08/news/trump-trust-what-we-know/index.html [https://perma.cc/JE9Y-
XLFC].  “One created ‘to hold assets for the exclusive benefit’ of Trump.”  Id.
(quoting Letter from Stephen J. O’Brien, Partner, Mallios & O’Brien PLLC, to D.C.
Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd. (Jan. 27, 2017),
assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3442581/
Trump-International-Hotel-Liquor-License-Filings.pdf [https://perma.cc/5JSP-JF3C].
Donald Trump Jr. and Trump Organization executive Allen Weisselberg were the
appointed trustees, whom Trump can remove at any time.  Id.
46. See Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 879.
47. Id. at 883–85.
48. Id. at 904.
49. Id. at 905–06.
50. See infra Section II.C.
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C. The Emoluments Clauses and Past Presidents
Considering prior presidents, it is evident that the district court’s
definition of emolument has not been consistently applied.51  For 
example, the Clauses were not applied to George Washington when 
he bought land from the federal government during his term as 
President.52  If the Clauses, particularly the Domestic Emoluments 
Clause, precluded business transactions, then President Washington 
would have violated the Clause.53  Another example is President 
Jimmy Carter.54  President Carter placed his peanut farm and other 
assets into a blind trust, yet his own attorney was the trustee—not 
someone who is exactly at arms-length and independent.55  Finally, 
there is President Barack Obama, who received the Nobel Peace 
Prize (an item of value56) during his presidency in 2009.57  At that 
time, the Office of Legal Counsel instructed President Obama that he 
could accept the Nobel Peace Prize without violating the Clauses.58  
However, when President Theodore Roosevelt won the Nobel Peace 
Prize in 1906,59 he waited until after his presidency to accept the 
medal and prize money.60 
51. See Seth Barrett Tillman, Business Transactions and President Trump’s
“Emoluments” Problem, 40 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 759, 761–67 (2017); see also
Bobby R. Burchfield, Ethics in the Executive Branch: The Constitutional, Statutory,
and Ethical Issues Faced by the Ethics Advisor to a President Holding Immense
Wealth, 22 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 265, 272, 276–77, 281 (2017); see also Rotunda,
supra note 35.
52. Burchfield, supra note 51, at 272; see also Tillman, supra note 51, at 761–67.
53. See Burchfield, supra note 51, at 272; see also Tillman, supra note 51, at 761–67.
54. Burchfield, supra note 51, at 276–77.
55. Id.
56. “The Nobel [Peace] Prize comes with a diploma, medal, and cash award.”  Anne
Marie Helmenstine, How Much Is the Nobel Prize Worth?, THOUGHTCO.,
https://www.thoughtco.com/monetary-value-of-the-nobel-prize-608598
[https://perma.cc/7C83-BMFX] (last updated Nov. 20, 2018).  The Nobel Medal itself
“is 18 karats green gold plated with 24 karats (pure) gold.”  Id.  “The modern Nobel
Prize medal is worth in excess of $10,000[.]”  Id.  The cash prize awarded to
President Obama was about $1.4 million, which he donated to various charities.
Helene Cooper, Obama Lists Who Will Get Prize Money from Nobel, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 11, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/12/us/12nobel.html
[https://perma.cc/5HBU-ZM68].
57. The Nobel Peace Prize for 2009, NOBEL PRIZE, https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/
peace/2009/press-release/ [https://perma.cc/EYU8-PT9Z] (last visited Dec. 18, 2019).
58. Rotunda, supra note 35.
59. The Nobel Peace Prize 1906, NOBEL PRIZE, https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/
1906/summary/ [https://perma.cc/6PGE-4P57] (last visited Dec. 18, 2019).
60. Rotunda, supra note 35.
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Scholarly articles discussing the allegations of Emoluments 
violations against Trump argue that such discrepancies mean either: 
(1) the Clauses were not meant to apply to the presidency, or (2)
emolument has a narrower definition than what the court held in
Trump.61  These scholars question why the Clauses would apply to
the presidency or why emolument would have such a broad meaning
if the very men who wrote the constitutional provision did not apply
it to President Washington,62 and such a broad interpretation would
prevent wealthy men such as themselves, with extensive business
interests, from holding public office.63  What is marginalized by these
arguments, however, is that the historical purpose and intent of the
framers is just one method by which to interpret the Clauses.64  It is
too simplistic to interpret the terse language of the Constitution using
only one method of interpretation.65
III. ANALYZING THE DISTRICT COURT’S HOLDING
A. Analytical Textualism, Legal Realism, and Our Common Law
System
Using only the historical, semantic, public meaning to decipher the 
meaning of a legal text, such as the Constitution, leans towards an 
originalist method of interpretation.66  Originalists believe that 
constitutional text should be given the original public meaning it 
would have had at the time it became law.67  However, it has been 
found that formal originalist interpreters, such as those likely to 
criticize the court’s determination,68 tend to “pragmatically enrich” 
61. See Grewal, supra note 32, at 641–42 (arguing that emolument is defined too broadly
and the correct definition is only the compensation one receives for the personal
performance of services as an officer or employee); see also Foreign Emoluments
Clause, supra note 30 (arguing that the Foreign Emoluments Clause does not apply to
the presidency, rather it only reaches appointed federal officials).
62. Burchfield, supra note 51, at 272; Tillman, supra note 51, at 761–67.
63. Burchfield, supra note 51, at 281.
64. See District of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 875, 886–904 (D. Md. 2018) (the
court looked to the text of the Clauses, the original public meaning of emolument, the
constitutional purpose of the Clauses, and the Executive Branch precedent and
practice in defining emolument).
65. See Victoria Nourse, Reclaiming the Constitutional Text from Originalism: The Case
of Executive Power, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 4 (2018).
66. Steven G. Calabresi, On Originalism and Liberty, 2015–2016 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 17, 
18.
67. Id.
68. See Burchfield, supra note 51, at 272, 281; see also Tillman, supra note 51, at 761–
67.
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the text of the Constitution.69  In other words, originalist interpreters 
often supplement the meaning of a word to reflect their own 
preferred policy positions.70  Therefore, one must adopt an analytical 
textualist71 approach to interpret legal text, like the Clauses, with 
respect to the entire Constitution; not separated into a term by term 
analysis.72   
Looking at the Clauses within the context of the entire Constitution 
reveals that a textual analysis goes against a narrow interpretation of 
emolument.73  For instance, it follows that an asserted meaning 
should not be cancelled out or contradicted by another portion of the 
Constitution.74  Therefore, when President Trump argued to the court 
for a narrower interpretation of emolument, stating that it only refers 
to “a payment made as compensation for official services,” or, in 
other words, bribery, the court found his argument unconvincing.75  
The court determined that to accept the President’s definition of 
emolument to mean bribery would be repetitive because bribery is 
addressed elsewhere in the Constitution.76  Additionally, the purpose 
behind instituting the Clauses, to prevent undue influence, is another 
interpretation method that further justifies the court’s holding that the 
Clauses apply to the President and that emolument may be broadly 
defined.77  In its consideration of emolument, the court took into 
account several methods while interpreting the Clauses, such as the 
text and purpose of the Clauses.78  Thus, the court’s broad definition 
of emolument is sound.79 
Finally, given the fact that it has been over two hundred years since 
the Clauses’ inception, it can be argued that globalization and the 
69. See Nourse, supra note 65, at 2, 10–13.
70. See id.
71. Analytical textualism is an interpretation method proffered by Nourse, who contends
that in interpreting the Constitution, one cannot just pull single words out of context
and put them in a newer context in order to create a meaning.  Id. at 10.  Rather, one
must ensure that the asserted meaning is not “inconsistent with the rest of the
Constitution.”  Id. at 10–11.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 31.
74. Id. at 10–11.
75. District of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 875, 887 (D. Md. 2018).
76. Id. at 897.
77. Id. at 904; see also supra notes 26–29 and accompanying text.
78. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 886–904.
79. See Nourse, supra note 65, at 10 (“If there is more than one implication, the
interpreter must engage in constitutional ‘construction,’ based on traditional pluralist
interpretive tools.”).
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general advancement of people and technology has made those in 
positions of power, such as the President, more susceptible to various 
influences than they were in the 1700s when the Clauses were 
instituted.80  Accordingly, from a legal realist perspective81 and under 
our common law system, “there is a legitimate role for judgments 
about things like fairness and social policy.”82  So, while precedent is 
important and does limit the outcome a judge may reach in our 
common law system,83 a judge may also consider whether the same 
rule or formulation makes sense in the current social context.84  
Consequently, the court’s determination that emolument has a broad 
definition of “any profit, gain, or advantage, of more than de 
minimis value, received by him, directly or indirectly, from foreign, 
the federal, or domestic governments” is a reasonable one.85 
B. What’s the Issue?
While the court’s holding regarding the scope and meaning of the
Clauses is reasonable,86 the issue is that there are inconsistencies in 
dealing with interests that may turn into conflicts issues for a 
president under the Clauses.87  Future presidents should be able to 
consistently determine whether their private interests will raise a 
conflicts issue and how to address these potential conflicts.88 
An efficient method of preventing undue influence and conflicts of 
interest is to sort them out and address them before they become 
issues under the Clauses.89  As stated in Part II above, often 
80. See generally Castells, supra note 1, at 38 (stating that new information and
technologies allow anyone and anything throughout the world to connect).
81. See Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical
Phenomenology, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 62–69 (Christopher P. Klein et al., eds.,
1996) (stating that one cannot ignore what is written down, but that rules are
malleable; one’s interpretation must make sense and be well reasoned given the
circumstances under examination).
82. David A. Strauss, The Living Constitution, U. CHI. L. SCH. (Sept. 27, 2010),
https://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/living-constitution [https://perma.cc/6YA8-
J5JC].
83. See Grant Lamond, Precedent and Analogy in Legal Reasoning, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA 
PHIL. (June 20, 2006), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-reas-prec/#Pre
[https://perma.cc/FWB5-8CX6].
84. Strauss, supra note 82; see also Kennedy, supra note 81.
85. District of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 875, 905 (D. Md. 2018); see supra
notes 80–84 and accompanying text.
86. See supra Section III.A.
87. See supra Section II.C.
88. See infra Section IV.A.
89. See infra Section IV.A.
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presidents will put their assets into a blind trust to avoid an 
Emoluments issue.90  For instance, President Jimmy Carter moved 
his peanut farm and other assets into a (not-so-blind) blind trust.91  
Similarly, President Trump moved his assets into a trust, but one that 
he is seemingly still able to access.92  President Carter was found to 
not be in violation of the Clauses, yet the district court has taken 
issue with President Trump.93  Thus, it appears that placing assets 
into a “blind trust” is not the best way to proactively address possible 
Emoluments issues.94 
A line regarding emoluments has finally been drawn by a federal 
court,95 but the line is not necessarily stationary and may be subject 
to movement given current policies.96  It should not be the 
President’s job alone to determine where this line is—that is where 
executive agencies come in.97  With Trump’s current situation,98 
however, it seems that executive agencies, particularly the Office of 
Government Ethics (OGE), have clashed with the President regarding 
possible conflicts issues.99  To establish a more effective process to 
adequately address conflicts of interest, this Comment proffers a 
solution to ensure the OGE remains capable of assisting the President 
in addressing and properly resolving conflicts issues before charges 
of an Emoluments violation arise.100 
IV. MOVING FORWARD
A. The OGE as It Is and How It Could Be
Currently, one of the duties of the OGE is to provide leadership
and oversight of the Executive’s ethics program, and to prevent and 
resolve conflicts of interest.101  In pursuing this duty, the OGE is 
responsible for “monitoring agency compliance with executive 
90. See supra Part II; see also Harris, supra note 11.
91. Burchfield, supra note 51, at 276–77.
92. See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text.
93. See District of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 875, 879 (D. Md. 2018); see also
Burchfield, supra note 51, at 276–77.
94. See Burchfield, supra note 51, at 278.
95. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 904; see also Foreign Emoluments Clause, supra note 30,
at 238–39.
96. See Kennedy, supra note 81; see supra Section II.C; see also Strauss, supra note 82.
97. See About OGE, supra note 16.
98. See Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 875.
99. See infra Section IV.A.
100. See infra Part IV.
101. About OGE, supra note 16.
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branch ethics program requirements.”102  The head of the OGE is the 
OGE Director, who is appointed to a five-year term by the President 
and confirmed by the Senate.103  This Comment proposes that the 
power to appoint the OGE Director should be reallocated from the 
President to Congress.104  Moving the appointment and approval of 
the OGE Director to Congress will better ensure that an objective, at 
arms-length individual oversees and prevents conflicts of interest 
within the Executive Branch.105   
Congressional appointment of the OGE Director is a viable 
solution considering that the OGE made headlines after Trump’s 
election due to public clashing between the Trump Administration 
and the OGE under former OGE Director Walter Shaub, who later 
resigned.106  Shaub’s resignation followed various disagreements 
regarding President Trump’s global business empire, specifically 
Shaub’s finding that President Trump’s intent to “retain financial 
interests in the Trump Organization . . . ‘doesn’t meet the standards’ 
of . . . four decades of previous presidents.”107 
Trump proceeded to appoint David Apol as acting OGE Director, 
overstepping the natural line of succession in which the deputy 
director becomes the acting director.108  While Apol has a long 
history of being involved in government ethics,109 President Trump’s 
decision was concerning to some, including former OGE Director 
Shaub and Larry Noble, general counsel for the Campaign Legal 
Center, a nonprofit, nonpartisan ethics watchdog organization.110  
Apol’s appointment as OGE Director was troubling because it raised 
the question of whether Apol was selected under the Trump 
102. Mission and Responsibilities, U.S. OFF.  GOV’T ETHICS, https://www.oge.gov/Web/
OGE.nsf/Mission%20and%20Responsibilities [https://perma.cc/PG6V-A3GG] (last
visited Dec. 18, 2019); see also infra notes 113–26 and accompanying text.
103. Office of the Director, U.S. OFF.  GOV’T ETHICS, https://www.oge.gov/Web/OGE.nsf/
Organization/Office%20of%20the%20Director [https://perma.cc/PG6V-A3GG] (last
visited Dec. 18, 2019).
104. See infra notes 105–44 and accompanying text.
105. See infra Section IV.C.
106. See Meredith Somers, Trump Taps Career Ethicist for Acting OGE Director, FED. 
NEWS NETWORK (July 21, 2017, 12:42 PM), https://federalnewsnetwork.com/manage
ment/2017/07/trump-taps-career-ethicist-for-acting-oge-director/
[https://perma.cc/37VR-W9HZ].
107. Julie Bykowicz, Government Ethics Director Who Prodded Trump Resigns, AP NEWS 
(July 6, 2017), https://www.apnews.com/2fcf378cfc4540018b4905d590e4f933
[https://perma.cc/37VR-W9HZ].
108. Horowitz & Alesci, supra note 18.
109. Somers, supra note 106 (stating that Apol is a thirty-year OGE veteran).
110. Horowitz & Alesci, supra note 18.
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Administration’s belief that he would be more lenient.111  By moving 
the appointment power to Congress, the President is guaranteed more 
objective feedback regarding potential conflicts from an independent 
ethicist.112  
Another troubling aspect of President Trump’s transition into office 
is the recent news reports regarding another executive agency: the 
General Services Administration (GSA).113  The GSA is an 
independent agency that, amongst other things, manages and leases 
government buildings.114  The recent news reports state that the GSA 
admitted that they chose to exclude possible Emoluments violations 
when they continued to lease the old post office building to President 
Trump for the Hotel115 (i.e., the building giving rise to alleged 
Emoluments violations in Trump).116  Ultimately, when President 
Trump was elected it was the responsibility of the GSA to decide 
whether President Trump would be able to keep the lease.117  The 
GSA released a forty-seven page report that stated “all” attorneys 
agreed early on that there was a possible violation of the Clauses.118  
Yet, the attorneys decided to overlook those constitutional issues 
without preparing documentation as to the rationale for their decision 
to ignore possible Emoluments violations.119 
Where was the OGE during President Trump’s transition into 
office and this oversight by the GSA?120  The OGE’s responsibilities 
include oversight of executive agencies to ensure that they follow 
ethics protocol.121  During this transition period, the then-OGE 
Director Shaub was being shouldered out by the incoming 
111. Id.
112. See infra text accompanying notes 149–61.
113. See Andrew Desiderio, Watchdog: GSA Ignored Constitution on Trump D.C. Hotel
Lease, POLITICO (Jan. 16, 2019, 5:15 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/01/16
/watchdog-gsa-ignored-emoluments-trump-hotel-lease-1106581
[https://perma.cc/3CEB-BRPM]; see also Charles S. Clark, Watchdog: GSA Ignored
Ethics Advice on Constitutionality of Trump Hotel Lease, GOV’T EXECUTIVE (Jan. 16,
2019), https://www.govexec.com/management/2019/01/watchdog-gsa-ignored-ethics-
advice-constitutionality-trump-hotel-lease/154234/ [https://perma.cc/Y6XS-93TG].
114. See Government Property for Sale or Disposal, U.S. GEN. SERVICES ADMIN.,
https://www.gsa.gov/buying-selling/government-property-for-sale-or-disposal
[https://perma.cc/9UDC-8VXH] (last updated Jan. 19, 2018).
115. See sources cited supra note 113.
116. District of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 875, 877 (D. Md. 2018).
117. See Desiderio, supra note 113.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See infra text accompanying notes 122–23.
121. Mission and Responsibilities, supra note 102.
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President.122  The overlap in timing of these events indicates that 
OGE oversight and procedure for evaluating and preventing conflicts 
in the Executive Branch needs work to fulfill the intent and purpose 
of the Clauses.123  A change needs to be made within the OGE.124  
Moving the OGE Director appointment to Congress will futher 
guarantee an objective, independent ethicist as OGE Director.125  
Therefore, when red flags emerge regarding potential Emoluments 
violations, they are adequately addressed and reported rather than 
swept under the rug.126 
B. The Criticism: Separation of Powers
A likely criticism of moving the power to appoint the OGE
Director from the President to Congress is that such a move would 
pose a separation of powers problem.127  The separation of powers 
divides responsibility amongst the three branches of government with 
the intent of preventing the concentration of power in any one branch 
and providing for checks and balances.128  With the rapid growth and 
complexity of our government, regulatory authority has necessarily 
been delegated from Congress to the Executive Branch through the 
establishment of executive and independent agencies.129  The 
Supreme Court has declared that such delegation, through enabling 
acts, is constitutionally permissible.130 
Thus, delegation of congressional authority to executive agencies 
has occurred for decades and has effectively been concentrated into a 
122. See supra notes 106–11 and accompanying text.
123. See supra Section II.A (stating the purpose of the Clauses is to prevent corruption of
the presidency and ensure the president remains independent from influence).
124. See supra notes 106–19 and accompanying text.
125. See discussion infra Section IV.C.
126. See Desiderio, supra note 113; see also Horowitz & Alesci, supra note 18 (reporting
on the concern that Trump appointed OGE acting director Apol in hopes that he
would go easier on the Trump Administration).
127. See infra notes 131–36 and accompanying text.
128. Separation of Powers – An Overview, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (May 1, 2019),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/separation-of-powers-an-
overview.aspx [https://perma.cc/E3G9-6Z26]. 
129. “In our increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical
problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under
broad general directives.”  Legal Info. Inst., Delegation of Legislative Power,
CORNELL L. SCH., https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-1/section-
1/delegation
-of-legislative-power#fn57 [https://perma.cc/DAH8-F2L7] (last visited Dec. 18,
2019) (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989)).
130. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372, 374; Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1, 42–43 (1825).
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“fourth branch of government”131 with executive oversight.132  
Because regulatory authority has been granted to agencies by 
Congress and such transfer of power has been approved by the 
Supreme Court,133 efforts to pull that power away from the Executive 
Branch and push it back towards the Legislative Branch will likely 
disrupt our governmental system.134  Moving the appointment power 
of the OGE Director may not only imbalance the separation of 
powers as it has existed since the early twentieth century135 but will 
also further handicap Congress by overloading it with too many 
responsibilities.136 
However, this criticism does not fully account for the purposes and 
goals of our American democracy.137  The separation of powers is 
deeply rooted in our democracy and aids not only in preventing 
tyranny,138 but also in providing a system of checks and balances.139  
This system provides us with democratic accountability, which is 
“fundamental to American constitutionalism.”140 
C. Congress Needs to Take Its Power Back
Moving the appointment power of the OGE Director from the
President to Congress does not constitute a separation of powers 
131. Elisabeth Slattery, Who Will Regulate the Regulators? Administrative Agencies, the
Separation of Powers, and Chevron Deference, HERITAGE FOUND. (May 7, 2015),
https://www.heritage.org/courts/report/who-will-regulate-the-regulators-administrativ
e-agencies-the-separation-powers-and#_ftn10 [https://perma.cc/7P7T-C2HM].
132. Mike Lee, U.S. Senator for Utah, How Can Congress Reassert Control Over Federal
Agencies? (May 18, 2017), https://www.lee.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2017/5/how-
can-congress-reassert-control-over-federal-agencies [https://perma.cc/VG5U-
GQWY]; see Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372, 374; see also Wayman, 23 U.S. at 42–43.
133. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372, 374; Wayman, 23 U.S. at 42–43; Legal Info. Inst., supra
note 129.
134. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372, 374; see Wayman, 23 U.S. at 42–43; see Legal Info.
Inst., supra note 129.
135. But see Lee, supra note 132 (arguing against President Franklin Roosevelt’s
adjustment of the separation of powers through the establishment of agencies
following the Depression).
136. See Legal Info. Inst., supra note 129.
137. See infra notes 138–40 and accompanying text.
138. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison) (“The accumulation of all powers
legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or
many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced
the very definition of tyranny.”).
139. See Separation of Powers – An Overview, supra note 128.
140. WILLIAM F. FUNK, SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & RUSSELL L. WEAVER, ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE 23 (6th ed. 2018).
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issue.141  Congress delegated this power to the Executive Branch and 
thus should have the ability to take that power back, especially when 
it is being misused.142  Although government growth has necessitated 
some degree of congressional delegation,143 Congress cannot turn a 
blind eye to the misuse of a power that traditionally belonged to the 
Legislative Branch.144  The separation of powers exists to prevent too 
much power from being concentrated in one branch of 
government.145  Over time, Congress has grown too lenient in its 
abdication of its power and responsibility.146  This has led the 
Executive Branch, and the administrative agencies within it, to garner 
greater power and influence.147  The degree of power and influence 
that has landed in the Executive’s lap was not constitutionally 
intended and alone constitutes a separation of powers issue.148   
The overstep of power and influence can be seen in the public clash 
between President Trump and former OGE Director Walter Shaub.149  
As discussed above, Shaub was effectively shouldered out due to 
disagreements regarding President Trump’s continued interests in the 
Trump Organization.150  Shaub’s replacement, Apol, was allegedly 
chosen because of potential partiality towards President Trump and 
his Administration—illustrating the troubling displacement of power 
between the Executive and Legislative Branches.151  By moving the 
power to appoint the OGE Director to Congress, the balance of 
power between these two branches of government will realign and 
“check” the overgrown power of the Executive Branch—better 
ensuring that an impartial OGE Director is appointed.152 
141. See infra notes 142–48 and accompanying text.
142. See Somers, supra note 106; see also Bykowicz, supra note 107.
143. Legal Info. Inst., supra note 129.
144. See FUNK ET AL., supra note 140 (discussing how accountability is at the heart of our
democratic government); see also Bykowicz, supra note 107; see also Somers, supra
note 106.
145. Separation of Powers – An Overview, supra note 128. 
146. See Lee, supra note 132; see also Pascal-Emmanuel Gobry, This Is How Congress
Can Take Back Power, WEEK (Feb. 5, 2016), https://theweek.com/articles/603522/
how-congress-take-back-power [https://perma.cc/EZ2D-WP4N].
147. See Lee, supra note 132; see also Gobry, supra note 146.
148. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison); see also Lee, supra note 132.
149. See Somers, supra note 106; see also Bykowicz, supra note 107.
150. See Somers, supra note 106; see also Bykowicz, supra note 107.
151. See Horowitz & Alesci, supra note 18.
152. See supra notes 145–48 and accompanying text.  “Checks and balances, principle of
government under which separate branches are empowered to prevent actions by
other branches and are induced to share power.”  Checks and Balances,
ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/checks-and-balances
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Accountability is a foundational element of a democratic system of 
government.153  Restoring the power of appointment to Congress will 
allow for greater accountability;154 greater accountability in that the 
OGE will, to a certain degree, be overseen by Congress.155  
Furthermore, direct congressional oversight of the OGE Director’s 
appointment will better ensure that a nonpartisan, independent 
ethicist is placed in that position.156  A truly independent OGE 
Director will also increase accountability of the President and the 
Executive Branch by providing unbiased and objective review of 
potential conflicts.157  An independent OGE Director will better 
permit consistent guidance for future presidents as to what constitutes 
an Emoluments issue and conflict of interest because those 
appointing the OGE Director will not be the ones whose private 
interests are monitored by the OGE Director.158  Consequently, this 
removes the incentive to select an individual who may show 
partiality or turn a blind eye to potential conflicts.159  Empowering 
the President to choose the individual in charge of evaluating their 
private interests is inherently flawed.160  This flawed process of 
appointment casts serious doubt that an unbiased, independent, and 
objective individual is being appointed as the OGE Director.161  To 
guarantee a truly fair review, the OGE Director should be appointed 
by Congress.162 
V. CONCLUSION
In a decision handed down by the United States District Court for
the District of Maryland in District of Columbia v. Trump, the court 
put a significant part of the arguments surrounding the scope and 
[https://perma.cc/S6TU-ENPN] (last updated Aug. 26, 2019). 
153. FUNK ET AL., supra note 140.
154. See Gobry, supra note 146; see also Horowitz & Alesci, supra note 18.
155. See Gobry, supra note 146 (“Ceding power to the executive branch is one way for
members of Congress to avoid being held accountable for . . . decisions.”).
156. See Horowitz & Alesci, supra note 18.
157. See id. (suggesting that by selecting an OGE Director known for his “looser”
interpretation of ethics rules, the President may have hoped to reduce accountability
for ethical issues arising from the Executive Branch).
158. See id.; see generally Somers, supra note 106 (discussing the extensive power of the
OGE Director position and the opposition to Apol’s appointment).
159. See Horowitz & Alesci, supra note 18.
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. See supra Section IV.C.
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meaning of the Clauses to rest.163  The issue that remains, given the 
court’s broad definition of emolument, is how future presidents with 
vast private interests can better detect conflict of interest issues and 
address potential issues appropriately prior to an alleged Emoluments 
violation.164  Currently, the OGE is headed by a Director appointed 
by the President;165 a system that risks the President selecting an 
individual based on a belief that the appointee will show the 
President leniency.166  The current appointment power of the OGE 
Director must be removed from the President and granted to 
Congress.167  This movement of power is necessary to ensure an 
independent, objective, and arms-length ethicist is appointed as 
Director; one who can consistently and clearly identify conflicts of 
interest issues within the Executive Branch.168  This movement of 
power will also rebalance the separation of powers to ensure that the 
overgrown power of the Executive Branch is “checked.”169 
163. See supra Section II.B.
164. See supra Part IV.
165. About OGE, supra note 16.
166. See Horowitz & Alesci, supra note 18.
167. See supra Part IV.
168. See supra Section IV.C.
169. See supra Section IV.C.
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